Introduction
Executive compensation is under scrutiny on both sides of the Atlantic. Although the level of compensation in Europe is below that in the US, European compensation levels have been catching up and increased rapidly during the last five years. It is not only the level of compensation that causes debate but also the timing of large payments to executives relative to earnings of firms, and relative to increases in labor costs and real income in a country. There are times when the public perceives large payments to executives as particularly controversial. One possible source of such perceptions is developments in the macro economy. If, for example, performance linked compensation increases substantially as a result of domestic or international macroeconomic developments, these increases may be considered a windfall for management. If this happens during a period when unemployment is high and wage increases low, a high compensation level may be considered particularly undeserved. In other scenarios, the contribution of the macro economy to changes in compensation could be negative. One The economic motivation for analyzing the impact of macroeconomic fluctuations on executive compensation is that changes in performance-based compensation caused by macroeconomic events may weaken or distort incentives of management to focus their efforts on enhancing the firm's competitiveness and shareholder value. A large share of changes in compensation will be based on factors entirely beyond executives' control, if macroeconomic drivers of performance cannot be forecast, or if production and sales efforts cannot be adjusted to take advantage of macroeconomic developments.
Macroeconomic fluctuations can be expected to have a substantial impact on the performance of most firms and, thereby, on performance-linked compensation. The impact on the performance of any particular firm depends on the macroeconomic sensitivity of each firm's particular business, and on what aspect of performance we are concerned about. Cash flows and earnings can be expected to be more sensitive to macroeconomic shocks than sales for most firms, since costs are netted out to obtain the former performance measures. The macroeconomic impact on stock market returns should be smaller than the impact on cash flows and earnings, since stock returns reflect expectations for relatively long periods over which macroeconomic fluctuations tend to cancel out. Thus, the effects of macroeconomic fluctuations on the time pattern of executive compensation payments will depend on the link between compensation and the different aspects of performance, as well as on the sensitivity of relevant performance measures to macroeconomic events.
In Oxelheim and Wihlborg (2003) the case of Electrolux was used to illustrate how changes in performance can be decomposed into one "intrinsic" component and one component caused by macroeconomic developments. They used a set of domestic and foreign macroeconomic price variables (exchange rates, interest rates, price levels)
to filter out the macroeconomic component from total changes in performance from quarter to quarter. The reason for using price variables is that they can be observed without a long lag. Therefore, they can be used to decompose very recent changes in performance and, thereby, to adjust compensation. The particular price variables employed in the decomposition could vary from firm to firm depending on product and market characteristics.
In this paper we decompose changes in compensation rather than in a "intrinsic" competitiveness. We control for industry factors as well. One set of macroeconomic variables are used in the decomposition for all firms. Thereby, the macroeconomic influences on performance in many firms could be underestimated, since the appropriate set of variables is likely to be firm-specific.
Macroeconomic effects on compensation can occur through a number of channels depending on what aspects of performance affect salaries and bonus of CEOs.
We distinguish between effects on salaries and on bonus and we analyze the extent to which the macroeconomic effects depend on their impact on common performance measures like sales and market values versus influences on salaries and bonus through aspects of performance that we cannot identify. Boards in some firms may have stable salaries and predetermined rules for bonus payments based on a particular performance measure. Other boards may set the CEO salary based on a number of criteria that can vary from period to period but, nevertheless, create a systematic relation between macroeconomic factors and compensation.
Some early studies of executive compensation across firms focused on the relation between CEO compensation and firm performance (Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985; Murphy, 1985 Murphy, , 1986 Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Abowd, 1990; Leonard, 1990) , while other studies analyzed whether CEOs are rewarded for performance relative to the market or relative to industry factors (Antle and Smith, 1986; Gibbons and Murphy, 1990; Bebchuk and Grinstein 2005) . Whether CEO compensation is more closely tied to firm size or firm profits is controversial due to a multicolinearity problem among the independent variables in the regressions (Ciscel and Carroll, 1980; Rosen, 1992) .
We focus on the impact of macroeconomic and industry factors, as well as firm- In Section 2, we discuss in more detail how managerial incentives are influenced by macroeconomic influences on compensation. The data set for compensation in the form of salary and bonus is described in Section 3. Firm-specific and industry factors explaining compensation are analyzed in Section 4. The contribution of macroeconomic factors to compensation and performance measures is estimated in Section 5 using cross-section and panel analyses. In Section 6 we decompose compensation each year into an "intrinsic" component and a component caused by macroeconomic factors distinguishing between the total impact of the macro economy and the unanticipated impact. In section 7 we test whether there is simultaneity between performance and compensation, and we ask whether the results hold across industries and size groups.
Concluding comments follow in Section 8.
Macroeconomic Fluctuations and Managerial Incentives
Macroeconomic factors, as well as industry wide factors, are beyond managerial influence and control. To the extent these factors cannot be forecast, while influencing performance linked compensation, macroeconomic fluctuations create noise in the relation between compensation and the performance that can actually be influenced by management. Such noise weakens the incentive-effects of performance-based compensation schemes if managers are risk-averse (see e.g. Milgrom and Roberts, 1992) .
Management is able to reduce the impact of macroeconomic fluctuations on performance measures and, thereby, on compensation by means of risk management techniques and investments in flexibility (real options). A risk averse manager, whose compensation depends on macroeconomic fluctuations, has the incentive to employ risk management techniques excessively, if shareholder value does not increase with reduced performance-variance (Smith and Stulz, 1985) . Thus, to the extent compensation can be made independent of unanticipated macroeconomic fluctuations, managers' incentives with respect to risk management would be more closely aligned with shareholders' objectives.
Management may have some control over the impact of anticipated macroeconomic fluctuations on performance. For example, production capacity can be raised in response to a forecast of an increase in aggregate demand in the economy, or shifted towards countries with cost advantages in response to a forecast of changes in real exchange rates. Such changes in the production capacity and in other aspects of operations are likely to require some lead time. In some firms the lead time may exceed the time horizon for which macroeconomic developments can be forecast. Investments in flexibility (real options) increase shareholder value in many firms and they reduce the impact of relatively large changes in macroeconomic factors on performance measures. In other words, flexibility tends to introduce a non-linear relation between performance and risk-factors. Compensation schemes should be designed in such a way that they provide incentives to invest in flexibility to respond to macroeconomic events. Oxelheim and Wihlborg (2003) argue that if compensation is adjusted for macroeconomic fluctuations based on a fixed linear relation between these fluctuations and performance, then the incentives to invest in flexibility (real options) are retained.
The Compensation Data
Our dataset covers compensation for CEOs as well as Board Chairmen. The index for average CEO compensation for each year is displayed both in Table 2 shows that bonus payments increased much faster than salary payments.
Bonus payments increased 165 percent, while salaries increased only 14 percent. The former figure takes into account both that average bonus payments increased and that the number of firms paying bonus increased.
(Insert Table 2 Here)
Explaining Compensation without Macroeconomic Factors
In order to first identify the most important firm-specific factors explaining CEOcompensation, the above compensation sample is matched with firm performance We begin by analyzing how the cross-section variation of compensation levels (salary plus bonus) for the CEOs depends on a number of firm-and industry specific performance measures, and we ask whether the cross section pattern is stable over the data period. The following regression is estimated in cross-section for each year, as well as pooled:
In order to minimize the multicolinearity problem, we focus on variables and ratios that exhibit relatively little correlation with each other. The firm's total sale is used as a proxy for firm size. A number of performance variables were tested in equation (1) to find which one(s) explains compensation the best. The variables were return on assets, return on equity, and Tobin's Q. We found that Tobin's Q (measured as market value relative to book value) had the most explanatory power and the least correlation with non-performance variables. Therefore, Tobin's Q is used as the performance proxy from now on. Seven industry dummies are used to control for the industry factors. 2 All the variables in the regressions in this study are in logarithms. Therefore, the regression coefficients are interpreted as "compensation-performance elasticities" rather than "compensation-performance sensitivities". One of the advantages of the elasticity approach is that it produces a better "fit" in terms of marginal effects. Another advantage is that the elasticity is relatively invariant to firm size while sensitivities vary monotonically with firm size (larger firms having smaller betas) (Gibbons and Murphy, 1992; Murphy 1998) . Table 3 shows the results for equation (1) Table 3 Here)
Using the above firm specific factors, we estimate two random effects models with industry dummy variables in one and time dummy variables in the other. The results are reported in Table 4 . The results for the random effects Model 1 with industry factors is very similar to the results for pooled data in Table 3 except that the dummy for industry 3 is not significant. Thus, competitive conditions in particular industries do not seem to influence compensation much.
The time dummy variables are highly significant in the second column of Table   4 . The coefficients increase each year from [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] . The time pattern could be caused by macroeconomic influences. We return to this issue below.
(Insert Table 4 Here) Are the patterns for salary and bonus different? It can be expected that the bonus component of compensation is more sensitive than the salary component to performance-variation over time and across firms. Therefore the model with industry dummies is also tested for Salary and Bonus separately. The results are shown in Table   5 . There are fewer observations for Salary and Bonus separately than for the sum of these components, because all observations of zero Bonus are excluded. The Salary component is explained mainly by sales, while Tobin's Q has a strong effect on Bonus but no effect on Salary. Clearly and not surprisingly, compensation in the form of bonus is much more sensitive to performance from a shareholder perspective than salary compensation. The table also shows that the results for Salary plus Bonus are similar to the results for Bonus alone, although the coefficients for the total are generally smaller.
Since the results are so similar, and since we have twice as many observations for total compensation as for Bonus alone, we focus on total compensation in the following analysis of macro-factors.
(Insert Table 5 Here)
CEO-Compensation and Macroeconomic Factors
In this section we turn to an analysis of the macroeconomic influences on CEOcompensation. These influences can occur through the performance variables in equation (1) or through other variables influencing compensation. We investigate whether macroeconomic variables affect compensation independently of variation in Q
and Sales, and we analyze macroeconomic influences on Q and Sales. The total macroeconomic influence on compensation is the sum of these effects.
Macroeconomic conditions can be described using either quantity variables like GDP, GDP growth, investments and employment, or using price variables like interest rates, inflation and exchange rates. Although the former group of variables describes macroeconomic conditions, they are typically observed with a substantial lag. Price variables, on the other hand, can be seen as easily observable signals of underlying macroeconomic shocks and developments. A shock would have a certain effect on a group of price variables as well as on GDP, employment, etc. but only the former would be observable at the time a shock occurs. Therefore, these signals can be useful tools for decomposing compensation and performance into "intrinsic factors" and macroeconomic factors. Another advantage of using price variables like interest rates and exchange rates in the decomposition is that they adjust rapidly to both domestic and foreign conditions affecting a firm's performance. For these reason we prefer to use only price variables as proxies for macroeconomic conditions in the following. Specifically, we use exchange rates, interest rates, inflation and the market return in the stock market.
It is likely that each firm's performance is sensitive to its specific set of variables but here we employ one set to explain changes in compensation across firms and time.
Thus, we obtain estimates for the macroeconomic impact on compensation for the average firm. Dummy variables for firm characteristics could be introduced in the analysis but we restrict the use of dummies to distinguish between industries as above, and to separate relatively export dependent firms from others.
The following random effects model is specified to determine macroeconomic influences on compensation independently of variation in Q-values and sales: The assumptions about expectation formation are described below. Given those assumptions the unanticipated exchange rate and the anticipated inflation dropped from the model due to multicolinearity. Model 1 in Table 7 shows the results without these variables. The unanticipated interest rate turned out to be insignificant. The correlations in 
The results of the estimation of equation (2b) are presented as Model 5 in Table   7 . Before arriving at the formulations in equations (2a) and (2b) the market return in the stock market was included as another macro price variable that could serve as a signal of macroeconomic conditions. Neither the anticipated nor the unanticipated component of this variable was significant, however. Furthermore, an alternative specification of macroeconomic factors including GDP, the market return and the exchange rate change The return on the 1-year Government bond is used as the interest rate.
The expected exchange rate change over the next year is reflected in the current one-year interest rate differential (uncovered interest rate parity). Thus,
The exchange rate is SEK/US Dollars. All the changes are in percent.
The expected inflation over the next year is equal to the inflation last year. Thus,
The correlations between variables we have in cross-section and all other variables are reported in Table 6 . Among the price variables for which we have only five observations, the market return is highly correlated with several other price
Year 2001
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Year 2003 t+1
Year 2000 t-2
variables. This correlation explains why the market return is not significant in the regressions.
(Insert Table 6 Here) Table 7 shows the results when equation (2) is tested using the random effects model. 5 When macroeconomic variables are included in the random effects model with firm specific and industry factors, the time dummies must be dropped. There are some differences among the five models presented. In Model 1, both anticipated and unanticipated interest rates are included. As noted, the latter is insignificant and dropped to arrive at Model 2 in the table. In Model 3, a dummy for relatively export oriented firms has been added on its own and interactively with the exchange rate. The interactive term is insignificant and dropped in Model 4. Finally in Model 5, the full exchange rate change is substituted for the anticipated exchange rate change, since the correlation between the variables is almost perfect (and negative).
(Insert Table 7 Here)
The results in Table 7 show that CEO salaries and bonuses are positively and significantly related to firm size and firm performance after controlling for macroeconomic influences. The coefficients for both Sales and the Q-values are smaller when macroeconomic influences are included explicitly in Table 7 in comparison with   Tables 3 and 4 . Thus, it seems that macroeconomic influences occur through Sales and Q, as well as through other channels. These other channels could be earnings or other firm-specific performance measures. The particular variables used by corporate boards to determine CEO compensation may even change from year to year. The fact that Sales and Q are the performance variables with the greatest explanatory value indicates that 5 The robustness of the random effects model, Model 5, is further tested by using two alternative specifications, i.e. pooled, and fixed effects. Based on Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier test and Hausman test, the pooled and fixed effects models can be rejected, yet the random effects model cannot be rejected. In addition, in order to detect multicolinearity among all the factors, the variance inflation factors (VIF) are estimated by using the pooled regression. The average VIF is 2.38, and the individual VIF is within the range 1.26-4.44. Therefore, multicolinearity does not seem a problem in the model. much of the variation in compensation is linked to a time-varying set of performance indicators.
CEO compensation changes by about 2.4% for each 10% change in firm size, and it changes about 0.8% for each 10% change in firm performance as measured by Q.
The former finding is consistent with some findings from the US markets. Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) find in a US sample for the period 1993-2003 that a 10% change in the firm size results in a 2.14% change in CEO compensation. They also find that a 10% change in performance leads to a 2.11% change in compensation. Our results before controlling for macroeconomic factors in Table 3 are consistent with these figures, but when we control for macroeconomic factors the compensation effect of a change in performance in Table 7 is less than a third of the effect in Table 3 . In Section 7 below we ask whether this result is robust when we allow for simultaneity between performance and compensation.
Turning to the results for macroeconomic factors in Table 7 , the anticipated interest rate is negatively related to compensation. CEO compensation increases by about 12% for each 1% point decline in the interest rate (approximately equal to 1% of 1+Anti. interest rate).
The results for exchange rate effects are harder to interpret as a result of the high negative correlation between the proxies for anticipated and unanticipated exchange rate changes. The proxy for anticipated exchange rate changes is positively correlated with changes in compensation meaning that a depreciation of the SEK relative to the USD raises compensation, while the proxy for unanticipated changes indicates the opposite.
As noted, the anticipated changes are almost perfectly correlated with unanticipated changes and, therefore, with total exchange rate changes. We can simply not identify whether effects of exchange rates are due to anticipated or unanticipated changes although the variation in floating exchange rates tends to be dominated by unanticipated changes. In Model 5, where the total exchange rate change is included, a depreciation of the SEK has a negative effect on compensation. This sign is hard to explain for exportoriented industries. It makes more sense for multinational firms with large parts of their production abroad.
The export dummy interacting with the exchange rate change is insignificant in Model 5. Exporting firms seems to have had a faster growth of compensation, however, as shown by the significant export intercept dummy. 6 We turn now to the impact of macroeconomic factors on the performance measures, Sales and Q that systematically affect compensation. The following equation
is estimated for the Q-value: The Q-value is made a function of Sales, the macroeconomic variables identified above, and dummy variables in equation (3). The regression for Sales includes the Q-value, as well as the same macroeconomic and dummy variables. Table 8 shows that Sales has a small negative impact on Q when controlling for macroeconomic factors. This result indicates that sales generally are higher than what value maximization would call for. The anticipated interest rate has a strong negative effect on both variables. The exchange rate change affects Sales but not Q-values. A depreciation increases Sales as can be expected. The export dummy variable is also positive and significant indicating that the sales from export oriented firms are larger than sales from other firms. Unanticipated inflation is positively related to Q, but there is no significant relation with Sales.
(Insert Table 8 Here)
In the next section the estimates of macroeconomic influences on Sales, Qvalues, and on compensation at constant levels of Sales and Q will be used to 6 The compensation for the CEOs in the export firms is about 30% (which is (e 0.206 -1)*100) higher than in the non-export firms. decompose compensation into one component explained by "intrinsic factors" and one component explained by macroeconomic factors.
Filtering out Macroeconomic Influences on Compensation
How would compensation have developed if the impact on compensation of macrofactors would have been filtered out? Table 9a shows the impact on compensation of the total change in the macro variables for the period 2001-2005, while Table 9b displays the impact of unanticipated changes in macro variables. In Table 10 In each of the tables 9a-10 column (1) shows the percent of salary plus bonus caused by macroeconomic variables each year at constant levels of Q and Sales.
Columns (2) and (3) show the percent of Q and sales explained by the same variables.
Column (4) presents the sum of the effects in columns (1)-(3) using the coefficients in Table 7 Model 5 as weights. Thus, column (4) shows the percent of salary plus bonus explained by macroeconomic factors each year. In columns (5) and (6) we show the macroeconomic effects as percent of bonus payments only. The macroeconomic effects included in Tables 9b and 10b are caused by unanticipated changes alone.
Macroeconomic effects are calculated based on deviations from mean levels of the macro variables during the period times the coefficients in Table 7 , Model 5. The procedure for calculating macroeconomic effects on Q and Sales is the same, but the coefficients are obtained from Table 8 . The mean levels of unanticipated changes are zero.
Column (4) in Table 9a The total macro effects in column (4) are dominated by the independent effects in column (1) although the macro effects on both Q and Sales are substantial.
The total macroeconomic effects each year as percent of bonus payments only are presented in columns (6). Since bonus is only a part of total compensation the macroeconomic effects here are larger. Table 10a shows that in 2006 macroeconomic factors contributed to compensation an amount nearly equal (93.75%) the bonus payments.
(Insert Table 9a , 9b and 10 Here)
The contribution of unanticipated macroeconomic effects are shown in Table 9b for is assumed that all exchange rate changes are unanticipated.
The contribution of unanticipated macroeconomic factors to compensation is smaller than the total effects in the previous table. The time pattern is also very different. Table 9a Column (4) 
Robustness to Size, Industry and Simultaneity
Compensation schemes vary across firms and the relevant macroeconomic variables, as well as their impacts, vary across firms. For example, international firms are likely to be sensitive to macroeconomic conditions abroad. We do not have the data to conduct firm-level studies here but we can distinguish between size groups and industries.
Beginning with firms belonging to different levels of capitalization we run the regressions in Table 7 for Large-Cap firms separately. The results are very similar to the results presented for all firms in Table 7 in terms of coefficients as well as significance.
Therefore we do not show the results for Large-Cap firms here.
Turning to industries, the dummy for industry four (health care) was significant in most of the regressions so it would be of interest to investigate this industry further.
However, there are only 5 firms with 40 observations in this industry. There are even fewer firms in Industry 3 for which the industry dummy was significant in several regressions. Financial institutions in general are different from corporations so we ignore this sector as well.
Finally, we take into account that performance could depend on compensation.
After all, performance related compensation schemes are implemented with the objective of enhancing managerial effort on behalf of shareholders. If compensation schemes are successful, we expect the intercept term representing a constant rate of growth of compensation to be larger for firms with high sensitivity to performance. We cannot observe firm differences in this respect, however. It is also possible that firms with a stronger performance-compensation link will have relatively strong performance during periods when compensation is high as a result of manager's greater effort on behalf of shareholders. If so, there is a potential simultaneity problem between Tobin's Q, in particular, and compensation in the above regressions. Table 11 shows the results of regressions using a two stage procedure to explain compensation in comparison with the results of Model 5 in Table 7 . The results for this model are also reproduced in Table 11 . Instrumental variables, including sales and all anticipated and unanticipated macro variables in our data set, were used to estimate Tobin's Q in the first stage. The results in Table 11 show that the coefficient for Tobin's Q becomes almost three times as large as in the previous regressions and significant.
Thus, it is possible that there is some mutual dependence between performance and compensation. All other coefficients remain nearly unchanged, however.
(Insert Table 11 Here)
In order to further investigate the endogeneity of the Q, the Hausman Test, which tests the random effects model (REM) against the random effects model with instrumental variables (IVREM), is reported in Table 11 . Based on the Hausman test, the random effects model with instrumental variables in the last column of the table is rejected. Thus, the exercise performed in the previous sections with respect to the role of macroeconomic factors should not be seriously affected by simultaneity.
Conclusions
We have argued that managerial incentives to maximize shareholder value can become distorted or weakened by macroeconomic influences on performance and compensation.
In particular, if macroeconomic conditions cannot be forecast for a period that allows production capacity and other aspects of corporate operations to be adjusted, then compensation should be made independent of macroeconomic influences. If substantial adjustment is feasible in response to expectations about the macroeconomy, compensation should be made independent of unanticipated macroeconomic influences.
Firms differ with respect to adjustability of structure, capacity and operations, Table 7 , and Models 1 and 2 in Table 8 . The macroeconomic factors are risk free return, exchange rate, and inflation. In the columns (4) and (6), w 1 and w 2 are the coefficients estimated from Model 5 in Table 7 for the variable Log (Tobin's Q) and Log (Sales), respectively. Model 5 as in Table 7 Model 5 as in Table 7 IV Log (Sales) 0.235** 
